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CAN YOU HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO?
RATIFICATION OF RELEASES OF
ADEA CLAIMS
I. Introduction
Suppose a sixty-year-old employee is terminated after more than
twenty-five years of service and is given two options by his or her
employer upon termination: accept the standard severance plan tradi-
tionally offered to departing employees, or obtain a substantially
larger severance package, which includes additional weeks of sever-
ance pay, insurance benefits, accrued vacation pay and several other
benefits not included in the standard plan. In exchange for the more
extensive plan, however, the employee would be required to sign an
agreement releasing the employer from all claims existing prior to the
release, specifically age discrimination claims. If the employee takes
the more attractive financial package and subsequently determines
that he or she was the victim of age discrimination, questions arise as
to whether the release was binding and whether, if not initially bind-
ing, the release becomes binding if the employee retains the benefits of
the contract.I
This scenario is familiar to many older American workers. The
recent economic recession, combined with an aging workforce, has
created a serious problem for both employers and their graying
workforce. It has been predicted that by the year 2000, the number of
Americans over age fifty-five will increase by 15%.2 Nearly fifty mil-
lion workers aged forty and older were employed in 1991, and this
number is expected to rise as the older population increases. 3 Trou-
bled economic conditions exacerbate the problem, as acts of employ-
ment discrimination occur more frequently in a sluggish economy.4
With more and more people being laid off and terminated, the pool of
available workers grows, giving corporations the opportunity to "pick
and choose" in compiling their workforce, firing the employees they
have and replacing them with people who are more desirable for sev-
1. These facts are based on Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217, 218 (5th
Cir. 1991).
2. See David Pryor, New Law Battles Age Discrimination, TRIAL, Apr. 1991, at 30
n. 1.
3. Randall Samborn, Age Suits Allowed to Proceed; Keeping Severance OK'd, NAT'L
L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 3.
4. Diane E. Lewis, As Economy Sours, Work Bias Complaints are Reported to Soar,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1991, at 8.
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eral reasons, some of which are discriminatory.' A common example
occurs when employers replace their older, more expensive workers
with younger employees who will work at lower salaries.
As acts of employment discrimination become more frequent,
charges of such discrimination substantially increase.' Workers are
more likely to file employment discrimination complaints when jobs
are lost during an economic slump.7 The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") reported that the number of age bias
claims rose 20% to 17,449 in 199 1, after having dropped the previous
four years. Increased litigiousness may result in part from the anger
and frustration experienced by terminated employees as they search
unsuccessfully for employment in a sluggish job market. An em-
ployee who has since found new employment is more likely to put
past discrimination behind him or her than a person who remains
unemployed.9
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")' ° was en-
acted by Congress to combat age discrimination against workers forty
years of age and over." Since its enactment, the ADEA has under-
gone a continuous process of evolution, in which several issues have
emerged to define the Act and its provisions. This Note focuses on
one issue that has arisen out of the ADEA - employers' use of waiv-
ers through which employees agree to release employers from any age
discrimination claims in exchange for additional severance pay and
benefits. 12 Specifically, this Note analyzes the most recent contro-
5. Id.
6. Lewis, supra note 4, at 8 (employment discrimination cases rise ten times faster
than all other federal lawsuits during an economic downturn).
7. Id.
8. Linda Grant, Fired at Fifty, Older Workers Feeling the Sting of Recession, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at D1.
9. Deborah L. Jacobs, You're Outta Here; When Employees Have to be Cut, Pulling
the Switch Gently and Properly Will Keep Costly Litigation at Bay, ADVERTISING AGE,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 26. Litigation against one's prior employer can appear quite appealing
when one hears stories of successful age bias plaintiffs winning six-figure judgments
against their employers. See Jamie Beckett, Jump in Job Bias Suits Expected, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 10, 1992, at Cl (Jury awards $27 million to a 65-year-old man who
charged a subsidiary of Consolidated Freightways with age discrimination, one of the
largest verdicts ever in an age discrimination suit).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
11. Id. §§ 621, 631(a).
12. The terms "waiver" and "release" have distinct contractual definitions. A
"waiver" is "the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such con-
duct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1580 (6th ed. 1991). A "release," however, is "a writing or an oral statement
manifesting an intention to discharge another from an existing or an asserted duty." Id.
at 1289; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284(1) (1981) ("A release is
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versy concerning waivers: whether an employee who signs a release of
claims against his employer in exchange for additional severance pay
and benefits ratifies an otherwise invalid release by retaining the sever-
ance pay and benefits. 13 Part II of this Note briefly explores the fed-
eral age discrimination law. Part III traces the issue of validity of
ADEA claim waivers by examining the judicial and legislative treat-
ment of this issue. Part IV discusses the current division among the
courts over whether employee ratification of an ADEA waiver is a
valid defense available to an employer. This Note concludes by pro-
posing that an employee's failure to immediately tender back 4 the
benefits received for signing an invalid release should not constitute a
per se ratification of the invalid release.
II. Background: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA was a product of the explosion of civil rights legislation
in the 1960s. 5 Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII") 16 omitted age as a class protected from discrimination, it
included a provision which directed the Secretary of Labor to make a
"full and complete study of the factors which might tend to result in
discrimination in employment because of age and the consequences of
such discrimination on the economy and on individuals affected."' 7
Responding to Title VII's mandate, the Secretary of Labor issued a
report in 1965 from which the ADEA evolved."8 The report deter-
mined that many employers had adopted arbitrary, unfounded age
a writing providing that a duty owed to the maker of the release is discharged immedi-
ately or on the occurrence of a condition.").
The courts and Congress fail to see any meaningful distinction between these two terms
in the context of the ADEA. These terms are therefore used interchangeably to refer to
an employee's forbearance of the right to bring an action under the ADEA. This Note
adopts this approach.
13. Such ratification would preclude the employee from raising an ADEA claim
against his employer, even if the release he signed was statutorily invalid. See infra notes
119-27 and accompanying text.
14. For the purposes of this Note, the "tender back requirement" refers to the con-
cept that an employee who has received additional severance pay benefits in exchange for
his release of ADEA claims should be required to tender back the additional severance
pay to the employer as a condition to allowing the employee to sue the employer on an
ADEA claim. See infra Part IV.
15. See JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2d ed.
1990). Pertinent civil rights legislation of the era which preceded the ADEA includes the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights
Act.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (1964)(superseded by § 10 of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, 86 Stat. 111 (1972)).
18. See KALET, supra note 15, at 3.
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limits, based wholly upon stereotypes, 9 which had an adverse effect
on older workers. The report described a twofold detriment to the
nation from age discrimination. Financially, arbitrary age discrimina-
tion deprives the nation of the productive labor of millions of individ-
uals and substantially increases unemployment insurance and social
security benefits to be paid.20 Socially, it inflicts economic and psy-
chological injury upon its victims. 21
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA "to promote employment of
older persons based on ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and work-
ers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age in
employment. ' 22 The Act proscribes discrimination by employers on
the basis of age against individuals over age forty and covers all stages
of the employment process. 23 The ADEA's prohibitions24 cover pri-
19. See Robert E. Boehmer, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act - Reduc-
tions in Force as America Grays, 28 AM. Bus. L.J., 379, 381 (1990). Some common stereo-
types about older workers are that they do not want to work, cannot adapt to
technological change, are less productive than their younger counterparts, miss work
more frequently due to illness, and suffer an unusual incidence of memory lapse and
mental problems. These stereotypes are not simply unfounded, they are generally incor-
rect. See Guy Halverson, Older Workers Shine in Study of Performance, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 24, 1991, at 9. The Commonwealth Fund, a private national philan-
thropy, performed a study reviewing the work habits of older employees. The study
found that older workers have very flexible work habits, are easy to train, are more suc-
cessful in attracting business, and have lower turnover and absenteeism rates than their
younger counterparts. Id.
20. KALET, supra note 15, at 2; see Boehmer, supra note 19, at 387.
21. KALET, supra note 15, at 2.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The Act provides, in relevant part:
§ 621. Congressional statement of findings and purpose.
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and espe-
cially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job per-
formance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relevant to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce of arbitrary discrimina-
tion in employment because of age burdens commerce and the free flow of
goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this Act to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age in employment.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), 631(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2
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vate sector employers, labor organizations, employment agencies, and
government employers.25
The ADEA developed as a "hybrid" of two previously enacted
Acts - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA").2 7 Title VII provided the enforce-
ment scheme for the ADEA; the FLSA added the remedial devices.2"
The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for the administrative
supervision and enforcement of the ADEA.29
To state an ADEA claim, the ADEA plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination. 30 The employer can then as-
(1992) ("It is unlawful in situations where this Act applies, for an employer to discrimi-
nate in hiring or in any other way by giving preference because of age between individuals
40 and over.").
24. The ADEA's prohibitions are contained in § 623(a), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The Act also prohibits "retaliation," discrimina-
tion against an employee because the employee "has opposed any practice made unlaw-
ful" by the ADEA, or because the employee has filed a charge or "participated in any
manner" in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation involving the ADEA. Id. § 623(d).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. 1992). When the ADEA was first enacted, its
protections extended exclusively to individuals between 40 and 65 years old who were
employed in the private sector. Subsequent amendments have extended the coverage to
government employees, and have removed the upper age limit. See KALET, supra note
15, at 3; 3A ARTHUR LARSON AND LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 98-10, at 21-1 (1992). Although the ADEA covers federal employees, there are certain
procedural and substantive differences in the ADEA's application to members of this
group. 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
28. KALET, supra note 15, at 2-3.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The ADEA was originally supervised
and enforced by the Wage and Hour Administration of the United States Department of
Labor. In 1978, President Carter submitted a plan pursuant to the Reorganization Act of
1977, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978), which transferred this
authority from the Department of Labor to the EEOC. The EEOC's Regulations on
Enforcement of the ADEA are codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625-1627 (1992).
30. See KALET, supra note 15, at 67, 74-77; DANIEL P. O'MEARA, PROTECTING THE
GROWING NUMBER OF OLDER WORKERS: THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT ACT 98-103 (1989). The Supreme Court set forth requirements for establishing a
prima facie case of employment discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) (racial discrimination). The Court held that the plaintiff must ini-
tially establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that he is a member of
a minority group; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
.1993]
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sert one of four defenses3I against the charge.32 Section 4(0 of the Act
states that it is not unlawful for any employer to take any action
otherwise prohibited: (1) where age is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business; (2) where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age; (3) where such practices involve an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with the Act would
cause the employer to violate the laws of the country in which such
workplace is located; (4) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority
system that is not intended to evade the purposes of the Act; or (5) to
discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.a
III. The First Hurdle: Validity of ADEA Releases and the
"Knowing and Voluntary" Standard34
In addition to the defenses listed above, employers have attempted
to shield themselves from ADEA liability through use of the waiver
and release defense. 3' This section describes the manner in which
ADEA claim waivers are used and discusses the validity of these
waivers as determined under current law.
In order to avoid the expense and inconvenience of ADEA litiga-
tion, an employer may choose to offer an employee additional sever-
ance pay and benefits during the employee's exit interview, provided
that the employee agrees to sign a waiver of all ADEA claims he
might have against the employer. Employers have consistently relied
on these waivers as an affirmative defense to an employee's charges of
age discrimination.
was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) that the
employer kept the position open and actively sought applicants with plaintiff's qualifica-
tions subsequent to rejecting the plaintiff. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff is successful in prov-
ing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for his actions against the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff is then
allowed the opportunity to show that the employer's articulated reason for his actions
was mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804; see also Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
32. See KALET, supra note 15, at 78-80.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See KALET, supra note 15, at 88-104.
Business or economic necessity may also be a defense available to employers, though it is
not specifically provided for in the text of the ADEA. Id. at 79-80. This defense should
not be confused with the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" (RFOA) defense which is
provided for in the Act at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
34. For a thorough discussion of the validity of ADEA waivers, see Mary Elizabeth
Metz, Note, Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 59 U.M.K.C. L.
Rev. 351 (1991).
35. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
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The text of the ADEA does not give any guidance as to the use or
validity of ADEA claim waivers and releases. In general, a release of
an employment discrimination claim is valid only if it is "knowing"
and "voluntary. ' 36  Since the ADEA's enactment in 1967, courts
have been confronted with questions concerning the application of
this standard to releases of ADEA claims. In response, there has
been a great deal of activity in the legislative and judicial branches of
government to attempt to determine whether an employee can waive
his claims under the ADEA and, if so, under what conditions.
A. Title VII, FLSA and the EEOC - Setting the Stage for
ADEA Waivers
Since the ADEA is silent on the waiver issue, courts have fre-
quently turned to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")37 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438 for guidance.
The Supreme Court dealt with the waiver validity issue in the con-
text of Title VII rights in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 39 Title
VII prohibits discrimination in employment with respect to race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."" In Alexander, the Court held
that a waiver given as part of a settlement of an actual claim under the
civil rights statute would be valid, provided that the employee's con-
sent to the waiver of rights as settlement was knowing and volun-
tary. 1 The Court held that this ruling did not apply, however, to
waivers of prospective Title VII claims, ruling that such waivers would
be per se invalid.42 Courts have consistently used Alexander's reason-
ing to uphold waivers of accrued Title VII claims. 3
The Supreme Court has taken a different view in dealing with waiv-
ers of rights under the FLSA.4" The FLSA established a federal mini-
36. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n. 15 (1974) (waiver of Title
VII claims).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
39. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
41. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52 & n.15.
42. Id. at 51.
43. See, e.g., Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990) (employee's work experience and education level, coupled
with the unambiguous language of releases of "all claims" was sufficient to constitute a
knowing and voluntary release of Title VII rights; employee was sophisticated enough to
know that "all claims" included all legal claims); Pilon v. University of Minn., 710 F.2d
466 (8th Cir. 1983) (waiver of claims under Title VII satisfied the knowing and voluntary
standard because employee was represented by an attorney throughout negotiations).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
1993]
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mum wage,45 mandated overtime pay," and established maximum
hour requirements for businesses engaged in interstate commerce. 7
Violations of the statute entitle the aggrieved employee to back pay
and overtime pay. 8 The text of the FLSA is silent, however, on the
issue of waivers of FLSA claims.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of validity of FLSA waiv-
ers in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil49 and D.A. Schulte, Inc. v.
Gangi.5° In O'Neil, the Court considered the fundamental policy be-
hind the FLSA and the legislative history of the Act and held that, in
the absence of a bona fide dispute between the parties over liability, an
employee's written waiver of his right to liquidated damages under
the FLSA was unenforceable.51 The Court found that the purpose of
the FLSA was to "aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid
of the nation's working population"52 and to remedy the inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees by providing
standards of minimum wages and maximum hours. In light of this
policy, the Court held that "to allow waiver of statutory wages by
agreement would nullify the purposes of the [FLSA]."53
Approximately one year later, the Court supplemented the O'Neil
holding with its decision in D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi.54 In Gangi,
the Court held that waivers of liquidated damages given in settlement
of a bona fide legal dispute were also invalid under the FLSA.55 in
reaching its conclusion, the Court reiterated the public policy and leg-
islative intent of the FLSA which it had relied upon in O'Neil.5 6 Spe-
cifically, the Court stated: "We think the purpose of the [FLSA],
which... was to secure for the lowest paid segment of the nation's
workers a subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion that neither wages
45. Id. § 206.
46. Id. § 207(e)(5).
47. Id. § 207(a).
48. Id. § 216(b).
49. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
50. 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
51. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 713.
52. Id. at 706 n.18.
53. Id. at 707.
54. 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
55. Id. at 115. The Court limited its holding in Gangi to bona fide legal disputes. The
Court did not discuss whether the decision also applied to cases involving bona fide fac-
tual disputes; however, it did cite a district court case that permitted the use of un-
supervised waivers in the presence of a bona fide factual dispute. Id. at 115 n. 10 (citing
Strand v. Garden Valley Tel. Co., 51 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (D. Minn. 1943)); but see
Lynn's Food Stores v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (waivers of bona fide
factual disputes invalid under the FLSA).
56. Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116.
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nor the damages for withholding them are capable of reduction by
compromise .... Such a compromise thwarts the public policy of
minimum wage, promptly paid, embodied in the Wage-Hour Act, by
reducing the sum selected by Congress as proper compensation for
withholding wages."57
Whether unsupervised waivers of ADEA claims should be treated
in the same manner as Title VII waivers, and therefore upheld,58 or as
FLSA waivers, thus being invalid,59 has been a source of great dissen-
sion among the courts. Some courts have held that the correspon-
dence between the policies and purposes of the ADEA and Title VII
required a finding that waivers are enforceable;' other courts have
reasoned that in light of O'Neil and Gangi, Congress'. specific incorpo-
ration of the FLSA into § 7(b) of the ADEA61 evidenced its intent to
invalidate all unsupervised waivers of ADEA claims.62
In 1987, the EEOC attempted to shed light on the issue by promul-
gating its own rule concerning unsupervised ADEA waivers.63 The
EEOC's policy stated that a release of ADEA rights was enforceable
absent EEOC supervision provided that the waiver was knowing and
voluntary." Unfortunately, confusion has clouded. courts' interpreta-
57. Id. The Court did not discuss its prior opinions in O'Neil or Gangi, however, in
its decision that knowing and voluntary Title VII waivers were enforceable. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
58. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
60. See Metz, supra note 34, at 362 n.90 (citing Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Corp., 708 F.
Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("employees may release, waive, or discharge their rights
under an employment discrimination statute provided that they do so knowingly and
voluntarily"); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 n. 11 (6th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986) ("[the policy of the ADEA] is similar to the
policy encouraging settlement of cases concerning rights under Title VII")).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
62. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (Congress, by referring to the FLSA
enforcement provisions in enacting the ADEA, was aware of the judicial interpretation of
the FLSA); but see Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 402 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 924 (1989); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d
1039, 1043 (6th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986) (purposes behind ADEA
and FLSA are obviously different).
63. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1627.16(c)(1) - (3) (1990).
64. The text of the EEOC's rule in 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c) (1990) provided:
(c)(1) Pursuant to the authority contained in section 9 of the Act and in ac-
cordance with the procedure provided therein and in section .1627.15(b) of this
part, it has been found necessary and proper in the public interest to permit
waivers or releases of claims under the Act without the Commission's supervi-
sion or approval, provided that such waivers or releases are knowing and volun-
tary, do not provide for the release of prospective rights or claims, and are not
in exchange for consideration that includes employment benefits to which the
employee is already entitled.
(2) When assessing the validity of a waiver agreement, the Commission will
1993]
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tions of ADEA waivers, despite the EEOC's ruling.
B. Judicial Intervention and the Knowing and Voluntary Standard
In the late 1980s, several courts addressed the issue of whether an
unsupervised waiver of ADEA rights was permitted under the Act.
Despite the fact that the FLSA, from which the ADEA derives its
enforcement powers, 6 has been held to proscribe the use of un-
supervised waivers, 66 every circuit court which has examined un-
supervised ADEA waivers has held that the waivers are enforceable
provided that the employee's consent to the waiver was knowing and
voluntary.67 In analyzing this issue, courts have generally taken one
of two approaches6 in determining whether the knowing and volun-
look to, and is likely to find supportive, the following relevant factors that
courts have previously identified as indicative of a knowing and voluntary
waiver:
(i) The agreement was in writing, in understandable language, and clearly
waived the employee's rights or claims under the ADEA; (ii) A reasonable
period of time was provided for employee deliberation; (iii) The employee
was encouraged to consult with an attorney.
These are not intended as exclusive nor must every factor necessarily be present
in order for a waiver to be valid, except that a waiver must always be in writing.
Moreover, even where these three factors are present, if a waiver is challenged,
the Commission will look to the substance and circumstances to determine
whether there was fraud or duress.
(3) No such waivers or releases shall affect the Commission's rights and respon-
sibilities to enforce the Act. Nor shall such a waiver be used to justify interfer-
ing with an employee's protected right to file a charge to participate in a
Commission investigation.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
66. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990),
aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (employees may settle ADEA claims against employers
without EEOC involvement); see also O'Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898
F.2d 1015, 1016 (5th Cir. 1990); Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d
399, 401-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 924 (1989); Coventry v. United States Steel
Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1988); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809
F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register
Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
68. A third approach is worth mention. The view that waivers of ADEA claims were
per se invalid was set forth in Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D.
Fla. 1990). In Gormin, the court held that to permit an unsupervised waiver of rights
under the ADEA would be contrary to the intent of the Congress that enacted the
ADEA. Id. at 1107. The court stated that the ADEA "clearly incorporates the FLSA"
and since waivers under the FLSA were impermissible, waivers of ADEA claims were
also impermissible. Id. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
unsupervised waivers were not per se invalid and would be permitted provided that the
waivers were knowing and voluntary. The court remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the totality of the circumstances indicated that the waiver was
knowing and voluntary. 963 F.2d 323 (11th Cir. 1992). See also O'Hare, 898 F.2d 1016-
17 (waivers of ADEA causes of action not void as against public policy); EEOC v. Cos-
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tary standard had been satisfied. Some circuits based their decisions
on basic principles of contract enforceability. 69 A majority of courts,
however, sought to determine the document's validity in light of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding its execution.70
1. Contract Principles
A number of courts have applied basic contract principles in deter-
mining whether an ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary. The
case that best exemplifies this approach is Runyan v. NCR.7 In Run-
yan, the plaintiff was an "experienced labor lawyer"72 who had read
the ADEA release prior to signing it and who knew of the possibility
of a discrimination claim.7 3 The court held that the waiver was know-
ing and voluntary, and therefore valid and enforceable. The court
based its decision on the plaintiff's prior experience and education, as
well as its finding that the language of the release was "clear and con-
cise. '"" The court stated that according to contract principles, if the
language of a written agreement is unambiguous, the court should
look solely at its plain meaning in interpreting the document. 75 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed and upheld the application of "ordinary con-
tract principles" in evaluating ADEA waivers.76
This approach was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Lancaster v.
Buerkle Buick Honda Co. 7 7 In Lancaster, the court held that since
the release agreement was less than two typewritten pages in length,
mair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1987) (although waiver of right to file a
charge with the EEOC would interfere with the public interest and thus be void as
against public policy, waiver of individual's ADEA claims was permissible).
69. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
71. 573 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
72. Id. at 1457.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court acknowledged that, in some instances, a release may be so broadly
worded that an employee would not know he was in fact signing a release. Id. at 1462.
However, the court clarified this by stating that "if all of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a release indicate the employee knew he had a potential claim and volun-
tarily settled and released his claim, the employee should not be permitted to avoid the
effect of a broadly worded release or waiver over what would, in such a situation, amount
to a technicality in its wording." Id.
75. Runyan, 573 F. Supp. at 1461. According to basic contract law, the plain mean-
ing rule states that if a writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its
meaning must be determined from the "four comers of the instrument without resort to
extrinsic evidence." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 166-67 (3d ed. 1987). There is a great amount of dissention between the courts
as well as legal scholars over the prudence of the plain meaning rule in light of the way
context and circumstances affect the meaning of the words of a document. Id.
76. 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n.10 (6th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
77. 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1987).
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was written in clear and simple language, and contained no ulti-
matums or deadlines, the release was unambiguous and enforceable.7
2. Totality of Circumstances
A majority of jurisdictions have rejected the use of contract princi-
ples in evaluating ADEA waivers in favor of the broader "totality of
the circumstances" test. These courts adopted the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test on the ground that the congressional purpose of
eliminating discrimination in employment is better served by use of
the broader test.79 In applying the test, courts identify and evaluate
various factors that indicate whether a waiver was "knowing" and
"willful" and therefore enforceable.8s
In Cirillo v. Arco Chemical Co. ,Sl the Third Circuit identified seven
factors to be considered in deciding whether a waiver was knowing
and voluntary: (1) the clarity and specificity of the release; (2) the
employee's education and work experience; (3) the amount of time the
employee was given to consider the agreement; (4) whether the em-
ployee knew or should have known his rights before signing the re-
lease; (5) whether the plaintiff was encouraged to seek, or did in fact
seek, the advice of an attorney; (6) whether there was any opportunity
for negotiation of the terms; and (7) whether the employee received
any additional compensation in consideration for the agreement.82
The court stated that "the important interests involved" demanded
closer scrutiny of ADEA waivers than that applied by the courts us-
ing ordinary contract principles.8 3 In accordance with this reasoning,
many courts subsequently adopted the Third Circuit's "totality of the
circumstances" approach in examining ADEA waivers.8 4
78. Id. at 541. The court also noted that plaintiff admitted that he read the agreement
and considered its terms before signing the waiver. Id.
79. See O'Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.
1990); Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 924 (1989); Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522-23
(3d Cir. 1988).
80. Coventry, 856 F.2d at 518.
81. 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 451; see also Coventry, 856 F.2d at 523; Cook v. Buxton, Inc., 793 F. Supp.
622, 625 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (court also took into consideration that release only comprised
four lines of text in a two page document and was not made conspicuous by defendant);
EEOC v. American Express Publishing Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
83. Cirillo, 862 F.2d at 451.
84. See O'Hare, 898 F.2d at 1017; Bormann, 875 F.2d at 403; Cook, 793 F. Supp. at
624; Ponzoni v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 299 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d
14 (3d Cir. 1992); Constant v. Continental Tel. Co., 745 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Ill. 1990);
Mullen v. New Jersey Steel Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1534 (D.N.J. 1990); Widener v. Arco Oil
& Gas Co., 717 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
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C. An Attempt at Resolution - The Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990
On October 16, 1990, Congress enacted the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act ("OWBPA") s5 to provide by statute that waivers that
meet certain threshold requirements, and are "knowing and volun-
tary" when executed, will be deemed valid and enforceable in the ab-
sence of EEOC supervision.8 6  The OWBPA was passed as an
amendment to the ADEA designed to clarify several of the ADEA's
provisions.8 7
In enacting the OWBPA, Congress abandoned its attempts to man-
date EEOC supervision of releases, 8 and allowed unsupervised re-
leases of ADEA claims. In lieu of EEOC supervision, however, the
OWBPA calls for "strict interpretation" of its threshold requirements
and "careful scrutiny of the complete circumstances" in which the
waiver was executed to ensure the protection of those individuals cov-
ered by the Act. 9 The OWBPA also departed from the enforcement
requirements of the FLSA,9° by stating that agency supervision of
waivers was not required. 9'
The OWBPA states that an individual may not waive any ADEA
right unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.92 In determining
whether the knowing and voluntary standard has been satisfied, the
85. Pub. L. No.'101-433, Title II, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (Supp. 1992)).
86. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1537 [hereinafter OWBPA Legislative History].
87. This Note deals with Title II of the OWBPA, which sets forth new requirements
for effective federal ADEA waivers and releases. Although not discussed in this Note,
Title I of the OWBPA is an equally important addition to age discrimination law. The
OWBPA is often referred to as the "Betts bill" because a major purpose behind the enact-
ment of the OWBPA was to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), which held that the ADEA ap-
plied to employee benefits programs only in very limited circumstances. The Betts deci-
sion severely hindered any age discrimination challenges by employees against employee
benefit programs as violative of the ADEA. Title I of the OWBPA is devoted to the issue
raised in Betts, namely whether an employer can treat older workers differently when
fashioning a severance pay package in conjunction with a reduction in force. Title I
prohibits age discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.
88. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had previously presented
Congress with the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989 in
an attempt to set certain guidelines for waivers of ADEA claims and to officially charge
the EEOC with supervision of such waivers. S.54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S356 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.,
H697 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1989).
89. OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1537.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. 1992).
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Act sets forth several criteria93 for determining whether (1) the waiv-
ing party genuinely intended and understood the waiver, and (2) the
action was taken in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake
of material fact.94
In the case of an individual separation agreement,95 the OWBPA
provides that the waiver will not be considered knowing and volun-
tary unless seven minimum requirements are satisfied. First, the
waiver must be in the form of an agreement between the individual
and the employer written in language calculated to be understood by
the waiving party, or by "the average individual eligible to partici-
pate." 96 Second, the waiver must specifically refer to rights or claims
under the ADEA. 97 Third, the waiver must not apply to any prospec-
tive claims or rights which may arise after the date on which the
waiver is executed.9" Fourth, the individual employee may "waive
rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to any-
thing of value to which the individual is already entitled. ' 99 Fifth, the
93. The drafters of the OWBPA specifically rejected the approach used in Lancaster
v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928
(1987), and supported the approach taken in Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d
Cir. 1988) in developing the criteria set forth as threshold requirements in the OWBPA.
See OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1537; see also supra notes 81-84 and
accompanying text.
94. OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86 at 1537. Prior case law in this area is
also helpful in making this determination. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Express Publish-
ing Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (plaintiff's claim that he "was in dire
financial situation, since [he] was the sole support of a family of six and [he] was one
month behind in [his] mortgage and car payments" did not provide grounds for avoiding
the release); accord Reed v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., 569 F. Supp. 672, 675 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (plaintiff's claim that she was under "economic pressure to support herself and
[her] son" was insufficient to support duress argument).
95. Individual separation agreements involve dealings between the employer and an
individual employee. The OWBPA distinguishes such agreements from group termina-
tions and reductions in force, which are subject to additional requirements under the
OWBPA. For a more complete discussion of group termination programs and reduc-
tions in force under the OWBPA, see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992).
97. Id. § 626(f)(1)(B).
98. Id. § 626(f)(1)(C).
99. Id. § 626(f)(l)(D). This requirement comports with the basic concept of consid-
eration in the law of contracts. Generally, an agreement or contract is not binding unless
there is consideration for the agreement. Consideration is found when some legal detri-
ment has been bargained for by the promisor and exchanged by the promisee in return for
the promise of the promisor. Applying this logic to the issue of agreements to waive
ADEA claims, the employer (promisor) bargains with the employee (promisee) for the
employee's waiver of ADEA rights (legal detriment) in exchange for the employer's
promise to give the employee additional severance pay. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JO-
SEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 189 (3d ed. 1987). Note that in order for
the consideration to be valid, the promisor must promise to do something that he is not
legally obligated to do. This is known in the law of contracts as the "pre-existing duty"
1993] RELEASES OF ADEA CLAIMS
individual must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney
prior to executing the agreement." °° Sixth, the employee must be
given a period of at least twenty-one days within which to consider
the agreement.10 1 Seventh, the employee must be given the right to
revoke the agreement within at least seven days after signing the
waiver.' 0 2 The agreement will not become effective until the revoca-
tion period has expired. 103
If the waiver is part of a group termination program or reduction in
force," 4 the drafters of the OWBPA felt that additional protections
were necessary to ensure that employees would be able to make in-
formed decisions before waiving their ADEA rights.105 Therefore, in
group termination and reduction in force situations, waiver agree-
ments must satisfy certain requirements in addition to those applica-
rule. Therefore, if the employer normally pays X amount of severance pay to exiting
employees who are not asked to sign a waiver, the employer must offer the waiving em-
ployee an amount greater than X in order for there to be consideration for the waiver. Id.
at 204-05.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(E) (Supp. 1992). This requirement does not mean that an
employee must in fact consult a lawyer or that the employer must provide legal counsel
for the employee; it simply mandates that the employee be advised to seek legal advice
before executing the agreement. See Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 454 (3d
Cir. 1988) (most important consideration is whether consultation with a lawyer was en-
couraged, not whether counsel was actually obtained).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(F)(i) (Supp. 1992). The only requirement set forth in this
2 1-day waiting period is that the employee be given an option to consider the agreement
for 21 days before signing, not that an employee may not sign until the waiting period has
expired. However, it may be prudent for the employer to allow the full 21 days to pass
even if the employee is willing to waive the waiting period in order to avoid later contro-
versy concerning whether the employee knowingly and voluntarily waived the waiting
period. See Douglas L. Williams, The Older Worker's Benefit Protection Act of 1990, R
176 ALI-ABA 961, at 3-4 (1990) [hereinafter Older Workers].
102. 29 U.S.C. § 626()(1)(G) (Supp.1992).
103. Id. The OWBPA does not give guidance as to how revocation should be handled,
i.e., telephone call, written letter, etc. For now it seems that it is within the employer's
discretion to determine how to handle such revocation. See Older Workers, supra note
101, at 3.
104. A reduction in force (RIF) is any reduction by an employer of a number of em-
ployees in its total workforce, usually done for economic reasons. See Boehmer, supra
note 19, at 383. The definition of a "group termination program" is less clear. The
OWBPA does not state a numerical guide for distinguishing an individual separation
agreement from a group termination program. It has been suggested that the safest ap-
proach for employers to take is to treat any agreement in which more than one employee
is involved as a group termination that should comply with the applicable additional
requirements of the OWBPA. See Older Workers, supra note 101, at 3-4; Douglas L.
Williams, Reductions in Force, Early Retirement, and Releases after the OWBPA, C 588
ALI-ABA 299, at 7 (1992) ("until the law develops and is interpreted by the courts, the
conservative approach is to treat all multiple separations as a reduction in force").
105. See OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1539.
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ble to individual separation agreements.1°6 The additional
requirements for group terminations and reductions in force are as
follows: (1) the employer must give all affected employees a period of
at least forty-five days, an increase from the standard twenty-one
days, within which to consider the agreement; (2) the employer is re-
quired to provide all affected employees with detailed information
describing the group termination program written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the average individual eligible to partici-
pate. This information must include (A) the class of individuals
covered by the program, the program's eligibility requirements and
any time limits applicable to the program; (B) the job titles and ages
of all persons eligible or selected for the program (similar information
must also be provided for those persons not eligible for the
program). 107
The OWBPA states that a waiver may be used to settle an age dis-
crimination charge already filed with the EEOC or an ADEA claim
filed with the courts, provided that the waiver satisfies the first five
requirements of the OWBPA108 and the individual is given a "reason-
able period of time" to consider the waiver." The OWBPA also pro-
vides that, in the event that the validity of a waiver is questioned, the
burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and
that the requirements of the Act were satisfied rests with the party
asserting the validity of the waiver - generally, the employer. 11"
Title II of the OWBPA became effective immediately upon Presi-
dent Bush's signing of the Act on October 16, 1990.111 The framers of
106. For a listing of the minimum requirements of OWBPA, see supra notes 92-100
and accompanying text.
107. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(f)(1)(F), 626(f)(1)(H) (Supp. 1992). The original House ver-
sion of the OWBPA included two additional requirements for group termination pro-
grams which were not included in the enacted version. First, it required that employers
notify employees eligible for the program of any adverse action which might occur if the
individual declined to participate in the program, and an approximate date when this
adverse action would occur. Second, the House version obligated employers to pay
eighty percent of the fees and costs for services provided by the employee's attorney in
connection with the waiver request, not to exceed ten hours per individual employee at
'the attorney's regular hourly rate. OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1539-
40. Neither of these requirements appear in the enacted version.
108. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(2) (Supp. 1992). The Act does not allow waivers to be used to
interfere with the EEOC's rights and responsibilities to enforce the ADEA, nor does it
allow interference with the protected right of any employee to file a charge or participate
in an investigation conducted by the EEOC. Id. § 626(0(4).
110. Id. § 626(0(3).
111. OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1541. The provisions of Title II
do not apply retroactively to any waiver signed prior to the OWBPA's effective date.
Title I of the Act followed a different effective date. Id.
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the OWBPA intended that the Act would "offer legal protections to
those employees who otherwise might have been quietly and unknow-
ingly manipulated or coerced into waiving their statutory rights." '112
The OWBPA also effectively resolved the issue of whether waivers of
ADEA claims should be enforced according to the provisions of Title
VII or the FLSA.11 3 By adopting the "knowing and voluntary" stan-
dard, the OWBPA adopted the approach taken by Title VII and is
within the enforcement provisions of Title VII. I 4 One issue which
remains to be resolved after the OWBPA, however, is what role, if
any, the doctrine of ratification will play in the area of ADEA
waivers.
IV. The New Hurdle: Ratification of Releases and the Tender-
Back Requirement
In recent years, employers have turned with increasing frequency to
the doctrine of ratification as a defense to charges of age discrimina-
tion filed by employees who had previously signed waivers of ADEA
claims. Use of this defense has become the subject of a heated contro-
versy between employers and employees, as well as between the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals. If the ratification defense is successfully
applied in the context of ADEA waivers, an invalid waiver can be
made valid from the first instance if the employee has, by words or
conduct, adopted the terms and conditions of the waiver." 5 This re-
sult would be the same whether or not the waiver complied with the
requirements of the OWBPA because no investigation into whether or
not the waiver met OWBPA's requirements would be necessary." 6
This defense is extremely appealing to employers who are faced with
the restrictive threshold requirements of the OWBPA.
Courts have taken two approaches in dealing with the application
of the ratification defense to invalid ADEA waivers. Some courts
have permitted use of the ratification defense based on fundamental
contractual principles.' Others have rejected ratification in light of
public policy considerations." 8 The following sections explain the
112. Id. at 1544.
113. See supra notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
114. See Metz, supra note 34, at 373.
115. For a more complete discussion of the ratification doctrine, see infra notes 119-27
and accompanying text.
116. But see Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 91-C4313, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12375 at * 12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1992) (OWBPA deficiencies of release may be per se bar
to ratification).
117. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
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underlying concepts of the ratification defense and analyze the differ-
ent approaches that the courts have taken in dealing with this issue.
A. The Ratification Defense and the Tender Back Requirement
According to the law of contracts, ratification is "the act of adopt-
ing or confirming a previous act which without ratification would not
be an enforceable contractual obligation." ' 1 9 If ratification occurs,
the obligation becomes binding as if it was valid and enforceable from
the first instance. 120 The theory of ratification is based on the premise
that the ratifying party has full knowledge of any facts which would
make the contract voidable, yet intentionally accepts and retains the
benefits received under the contract. 12' Thus, it is said that one "can-
not at the same time assail the contract and retain its fruits." 122
To rescind a contract 2 3 and avoid ratification, two requirements
must be met: (1) the party seeking rescission must rescind promptly
after learning all of the material facts which would entitle him to re-
scission;1 24 and (2) the party must restore to the other party any and
all benefits which he received under the contract, so that the party
seeking rescission does not reclaim what he has parted with, and at
the same time retain what he has received in the transaction.'25 The
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261-62 (6th ed. 1991); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 380 (1981).
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261-62 (6th ed. 1991).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 380 (1981); HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 595, at 1448 (1916) [hereinafter BLACK'S TREATISE]. In or-
der for the ratification to be valid, the party must have full knowledge of all the material
facts. Id. § 397, at 1030; Id. § 610, at 1474.
122. BLACK'S TREATISE, supra note 121, at 1448.
123. When a contract is rescinded, each party agrees to discharge the other party from
all remaining duties of performance existing under the contract. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 283 (1981).
124. BLACK'S TREATISE, supra note 121, § 396, at 1028; Id. § 617, at 1486-88; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 381 (1981). The Restatement states that the
party seeking to rescind the contract must manifest this intention to the other party
within a "reasonable time." Id. § 381(2). The following circumstances are considered
significant in determining what is a "reasonable time":
(a) the extent to which the delay enabled or might have enabled the party with
the power of avoidance to speculate at the other party's risk;
(b) the extent to which the delay resulted in or might have resulted in justifiable
reliance by the other party or by third persons;
(c) the extent to the which the ground for avoidance was the result of any fault
by either party; and
(d) the extent to which the other party's conduct contributed to the delay.
Id. § 381(3).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384(1) cmt. a (1981); BLACK'S
TREATISE, supra note 121, § 396, at 1028; Id. § 617, at 1486-88.
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second of these two requirements, return to the status quo ante, is an
essential factor of rescission; therefore, it is necessary that the re-
scinding party offer or tender the benefits received to the other
party.126 However, a failure to tender the benefits received is not nec-
essarily fatal. When, for example, a party seeking rescission spends a
large part of the consideration received before realizing that the con-
tract under which he received the consideration was voidable, it
would be unjust to preclude the party from suing on his cause of ac-
tion simply because he is unable to restore the full amount. 127 The
theory of ratification and the requirements of the doctrine have be-
come a major source of controversy in the context of ADEA waivers.
B. The Contract Principles Argument
Some circuits have utilized basic contractual principles when con-
fronted with the ratification defense in challenges to ADEA waivers.
In O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp.,128 the plaintiff was told, after
twenty-seven years of employment with the company, that her posi-
tion with the company had been terminated. 129 The plaintiff was
handed a form that stated, in relevant part, that she released the em-
ployer from any claims which she might have against it in exchange
for certain severance benefits. 130 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit analyzed the circumstances surrounding the release
and determined that O'Shea's decision to sign the release was "volun-
tary, deliberate, and informed" and therefore valid.' The court
went on to state that even if the release was invalid, the plaintiff's
subsequent acceptance of the severance pay constituted a ratification
126. Id. § 616, at 1482-83. In this way, the parties are each restored to the positions
which they occupied immediately before the making of the contract. Id.
127. BLACK'S TREATISE, supra note 121, § 396, at 1029-30. Black suggests that "sub-
stantial justice may be done" by allowing the party to tender back as much of the consid-
eration as he is able provided that the balance is reduced from any judgment which he
obtains through the lawsuit, or that the full amount of the consideration is credited to the
defendant at trial or deducted from the judgment recovered. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384 cmt. b (1981) (if the court can assure the required return
of consideration in connection with the relief it grants, it is not necessary to have a prior
offer or tender).
128. 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 177 (1991).
129. Id. at 359.
130. Id. The benefits that were offered to O'Shea under the agreement included: (1)
normal base pay for twenty-eight days following her termination; (2) all unused, accrued
vacation through the last day worked; (3) twenty-seven weeks severance pay; and (4) a
"determination" that she would be on unpaid leave of absence until a certain date so that
she could elect early retirement benefits as well as certain insurance advantages. Id. at
359-60.
131. Id. at 362.
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of the agreement. 132 The court based its decision on "ordinary con-
tract principles," which state that "retention of the benefits of a voida-
ble contract may constitute ratification."'' 33 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that she did not intend to ratify the agreement by
accepting the severance pay.134
One month later, the Fifth Circuit took the identical position in
Grillet v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 135 The plaintiff in Grillet was a sixty-
year-old Sears employee who was told, after twenty-six years as a per-
sonnel representative, that her position (as well as all positions com-
parable to hers) was being eliminated. 136 Grillet was given an option
- she could either accept ten weeks of severance pay, which totalled
approximately $9,000, or she could obtain fifty weeks worth of sever-
ance pay by signing a release waiving all claims she might have had
against Sears. 37 Grillet chose the $45,000 option and signed the re-
lease. 38 One week later, Grillet learned that three younger employees
in her department had been offered new assignments. Grillet contin-
ued to accept the severance pay entitled her under the release and
eventually filed charges of age discrimination one year after her termi-
nation, claiming that she had signed the release under duress and in
reliance on a misrepresentation. 139 Sears moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming that even if a factual issue existed as to the validity of
the release, Grillet had ratified the agreement by accepting and retain-
132. Id. Accord Cumberland & Ohio Co. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 936 F.2d. 846, 850
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 878 (1992) (releasor who retains consideration after
learning that waiver and release is voidable effectively ratifies the release); Widener v.
Arco Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (plaintiffs ratified their ADEA
releases by failing to tender to defendant the return of the consideration received and
retaining the benefits); Seward v. B.O.C. Div. of General Motors Corp., 805 F. Supp 623,
633 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (plaintiff ratified release by failing to tender back or refuse benefits
received after he became aware of alleged fraud and duress).
133. O'Shea, 930 F.2d at 362.
134. Id. The court pointed to a letter that the plaintiff had mailed to a U.S. Senator in
which she stated that she "purposely avoided [filing an] age discrimination action" until
she received her severance payment. The court stated that "[c]learly, O'Shea sought to
have it both ways," a result which the ratification doctrine was designed to prevent. Id.
at 363.
135. 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 218.
137. Id. There were two release forms from which Grillet could choose. One form
stated that the employee declined the opportunity to consult with an attorney; the other
indicated that the employee had obtained legal advice. Grillet ultimately signed the form
indicating that she declined the opportunity of legal counsel. Grillet admitted that she
was familiar with the forms because, as personnel representative, she had presented other





ing the money she received in consideration for the release. 1 In re-
sponse, Grillet offered to tender back the money she received in
consideration of the release if Sears would agree to reinstate her with
backpay. W This tender back offer was made more than two years
after her termination.1 42The Fifth Circuit held that Grillet had ratified the release by retain-
ing the benefits under her release after learning that the release was
voidable. 143 To support its decision, the court recited the contract
principle that "a party cannot be permitted to retain the benefits re-
ceived under a contract and at the same time escape the obligations
imposed by the contract."'" The court also rejected Grillet's argu-
ment that her tender back offer precluded use of the ratification de-
fense. Since Grillet had conditioned her offer upon reinstatement to
her former position with backpay, and since she had not fiiade the
offer until two years after learning of the alleged misrepresentation,
the court stated that the offer was "too little, too late,"1 45 and ruled
that Grillet should have offered unconditionally to tender back the
consideration she received shortly after she learned that the younger
department members had not been terminated.1 46
C. The Public Policy Argument
A number of courts have rejected the position taken by the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits in O'Shea and Grillet in favor of the position that
the ratification defense is contrary to the public policy of the
140. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 218.
141. Id.
142. Id. At the District Court level, Sears' summary judgment motion was granted on
other grounds; however, the District Court held that Grillet had not ratified the release
because she had tendered the full amount of the consideration plus interest. Id.
143. Id. at 221; see Ponzoni v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 299, 316-17
(D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992) (ADEA plaintiff ratified his release by
retaining the $135,000 consideration with knowledge of the bargain).
144. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220 (citations omitted); see also Widener, 717 F. Supp. at 1217
(although employees' release of employment discrimination claims was not knowingly
and voluntarily signed, defendant was entitled to summary judgment because employees
had ratified the releases by keeping the benefits); Haslach v. Security Pac. Bank Or., 779
F. Supp. 489, 493 (D. Or. 1991) ("[Plaintiff] cannot retain the fruits of the contract await-
ing future developments to determine whether it will be more profitable for him to affirm
or disaffirm it").
145. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220. The-court based its decision on the theory that a person
seeking rescission of a contract must attempt to restore the status quo ante, thus re-
turning the parties to the positions they held just prior to the agreement. Prior to signing
the release, Grillet was entitled only to ten weeks severance pay and the right to sue
Sears, not to reinstatement and back pay. Id.
146. Id.
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ADEA. 47 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted
this approach in Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 48
In Forbus, three Sears employees were informed that the Retail
Distribution Center at which they were employed was being con-
verted into a Home Delivery Center and that, as a result, the number
of available jobs would be substantially reduced. 4 9 Sears offered the
employees an enhanced severance incentive package to encourage vol-
untary severance and early retirement.15 0 The employees accepted the
package despite the fact that it was conditioned upon their signing
ADEA releases. 5 Thereafter, the employees discovered that Sears'
restructuring plans had been changed and more jobs were available
than had previously been anticipated. 52 When the employees asked
for their jobs back, however, they were informed that no jobs were
available. 53 The employees filed suit against Sears without tendering
back the severance payments. 5 4 Sears invoked the ratification de-
fense, insisting that the plaintiffs "cannot be allowed to retain the sev-
erance benefits at the same time they deny Sears the benefit of the
bargain by maintaining [the] lawsuit."'15 5
The Eleventh Circuit held that ADEA plaintiffs were not required
to tender the consideration they had received "as a condition prereq-
uisite to challenging these releases" and that the employees' "reten-
tion of their benefits during the pendency of this lawsuit does not
constitute ratification of those releases."' 56
In its holding, the court relied substantially on the reasoning em-
ployed by an Illinois District Court in Isaacs v. Caterpillar.'57 In
Isaacs, the court held that the tender back of consideration was not
required of employees seeking to challenge their ADEA releases. 5 8
147. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (1 1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 412 (1992); Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 26, 1992); Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 91-C4313, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12375 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1992); Isaacs v. Caterpillar, 765 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D.
Ill. 1991).
148. Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1041.
149. Id. at 1038.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1038.
153. Id. The court did not indicate whether younger employees had been returned to
their jobs.
154. Id. The employees instead offered to offset any judgment awarded in the suit by
the amount of benefits received. Id.
155. Id. at 1040.
156. Id. at 1041.
157. 765 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
158. Id. at 1371.
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The Isaacs court compared ADEA releases to releases of claims under
the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA").' 9 The court looked
to Hogue v. Southern Ry. Co.,' in which the Supreme Court held
that, as a matter of federal law, tender back of consideration was not a
prerequisite to the bringing of a FELA suit; rather, the court held that
any sum paid by the employer to the plaintiff should be deducted
from any award determined to be due to the injured employee. 6 The
Isaacs court stated that as FELA and the ADEA were both "remedial
statutes intended to protect employees," the reasoning used in Hogue
should apply to both.162 The court concluded that the tender require-
ment would interfere with the remedial purposes of the ADEA be-
cause it "will likely make it impossible for most employees to
challenge ADEA releases - a result that Congress plainly does not
want."1 63
The Eleventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in Forbus. Specifi-
cally, the court explained that:
[t]he court in Hogue found that a tender requirement would deter
meritorious challenges to releases in FELA lawsuits. The same de-
terrence factor applies to ADEA claims. Forcing older employees
to tender back their severance benefits in order to attempt to regain
their jobs would have a crippling effect on the ability of such em-
ployees to challenge releases obtained by misrepresentation or du-
ress. Such a rule would, in our opinion, encourage egregious
behavior on the part of employers ... "
The Forbus court adopted the public policy considerations outlined in
Isaacs as support for its holding that the tender back of consideration
was not a prerequisite to the maintenance of ADEA plaintiffs' law-
suits.' 65 These factors were: (1) the crippling effect that a tender re-
quirement would have on ADEA challenges; (2) recognition of
159. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
160. 390 U.S. 516 (1968).
161. Id. at 518.
162. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1366-67. The court also pointed out several court cases
which had rejected the tender back requirement for challenges to releases of claims under
other statutes. Id. at 1366 (citing Smith v. Pinell, 597 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Jones Act); Wahsner v. American Motors Sales Corp., 597 F. Supp. 991, 998 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act); Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 197 F.
Supp 827, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (Sherman Antitrust Act)).
163. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367. The court also acknowledged that the Grillet and
O'Shea decisions involved pre-OWBPA releases. The court suggested, however, that
"[the] law of tender.., is presumably the same after the OWBPA as it was before it. If
there was a tender requirement before the OWBPA, then there still is one; if there was
not, then there still is not." Id. at 1369.
164. Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1041.
165. Id.
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Congress' "continuing preoccupation" with ADEA waivers, and that
"a tender requirement will likely make it impossible for most employ-
ees to challenge ADEA releases - a result that Congress plainly does
not want;" (3) a tender requirement would "as a practical matter
undo the waiver provisions of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act;" and (4) a tender requirement would cause "insoluble practical
problems."166
In Oberg v. Allied Van Lines,' 67 an Illinois District Court followed
the reasoning of Forbus and Isaacs, and held that the plaintiffs' failure
to tender back the consideration provided by the employer did not
constitute ratification of the invalid releases. 68 The court acknowl-
edged that it was the first court to analyze the ratification issue in
light of the OWBPA's "more stringent requirements."'' 69 The court
considered the text and legislative history of the OWBPA in holding
that "a general tender requirement would interfere with both the
[OWBPA]'s specific requirements and its general purpose concerning
waivers of ADEA liability.""" The court stated that if it found that
an employee could ratify an OWBPA-defective release, it would be
holding that the employee could waive ADEA rights by ratifying a
release that was not knowing and voluntary when signed - a result
which was neither provided for by the OWBPA nor contemplated by
Congress. 7 1
Enforcing a tender requirement would also "encourage employers
to ignore the specific provisions of the [OWBPA] in hopes that by the
time their former employees discover that the releases are voidable,
they will be in no economic position to tender back or refuse to accept
the special severance benefits afforded to them."'' 2 For these reasons,
the court held that waiver by ratification was precluded by the strin-
gent requirements of the OWBPA; alternatively, ratification could not
occur unless the employer had disclosed all of the information re-
quired under the OWBPA. 73 Allied complained that the decision
was unjust because plaintiffs were receiving a "double dip" by retain-
ing both the benefits of the release agreement and the right to sue."14
The court, however, responded that there was no "double dip" be-
166. Id.; Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367.
167. No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1992).
168. Id. at *1.
169. Id. at *5. O'Shea, Grillet, and Forbus all dealt with pre-OWBPA waivers.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Oberg, No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506, at *6.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *7.
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cause "Allied got what it bargained for - a faulty release for special
severance benefits."'175 The court also provided that the money paid
by Allied to the plaintiffs for consideration for the releases would be
used to offset any damages awarded to the plaintiffs.1
76
The effect of the OWBPA on the ratification issue was also consid-
ered in Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp. 177 In Collins, the sixty year-
old plaintiff signed a separation agreement releasing the employer
from "all claims... arising out of the performance or the termination
of their employment relationship" in exchange for six months sever-
ance pay, totaling $51,650.178 The court held that since the release
did not satisfy several OWBPA requirements, it could not constitute a
legal waiver of an ADEA claim.' 79 The court also rejected the de-
fendant's ratification defense, stating that since the agreement did not
expressly include a release of ADEA claims, there was "no evidence
that the separation benefits plaintiff received were in exchange for a
release of his ADEA claim."'8 0 Therefore, the court held that the
ADEA claims were beyond the scope of the release and that even if
the technical deficiencies of the release did not constitute a "per se bar
to ratification," there was no evidence that the plaintiff "intended to
relinquish any potential claim under the ADEA when he executed the
release."1 81
D. What is the Solution? A Proposal for Compromise
The confusion surrounding the use of ratification as a defense to
challenges to ADEA waivers is evidenced by the division in the
courts that the issue has created. Whether ratification is a permissible
defense to such claims is an issue in need of resolution. If it is al-
lowed, the defense is a powerful tool for employers fighting ADEA
claims. When applied in the context of ADEA waivers, the ratifica-
tion defense operates harshly because it precludes any relief to plain-
tiffs with valid ADEA claims who are unable to tender back the
enhanced benefits they received as consideration for the agreement. 8 2
Through ratification, employers are able to avoid compliance with the
protective requirements of the OWBPA, 183 leaving many employees
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. No. 91-C4313, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12375 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1992).
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id. at *10.
180. Id. at *13.
181. Id. at *12.
182. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
183. Id.
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subject to manipulation and coercion in unknowingly waiving their
ADEA rights. Congress specifically intended that the OWBPA
would eliminate these injustices. 184
However, any proposal to curb use of the ratification defense must
consider the highly litigious nature of our society. Releases of poten-
tial claims are important tools used by employers to protect against
burdensome litigation. Employers utilize releases mainly as a shield
from the expensive attorney fees arising out of litigation, not merely
as protection against the potential awards that may be levied against
the employer if a plaintiff is successful in an ADEA suit. Where em-
ployers give value in return for a release and the employee retains that
value, the employer's interests should not be disregarded. In light of
these conflicting interests, this Note proposes that a compromise of
the two approaches currently used by the federal courts should be
adopted to resolve the issue of ratification of ADEA waivers.
Ratification should not operate as a per se bar to recovery for
ADEA plaintiffs who have signed releases, nor should it be com-
pletely barred from use as a defense to ADEA waivers. The ratifica-
tion defense should be limited to those situations where the plaintiff's
intentions underlying her acceptance and retention of the benefits in-
dicate that she truly wants "to have [her] cake and eat it too., 1 s5 The
important issues involved demand a closer look at all aspects of the
waiver,"' as well as the circumstances surrounding the employee's
retention of benefits.
First, if it is clear that the plaintiff intended to ratify the agreement
by accepting the benefits in spite of her knowledge that the release was
voidable and waited until she had received all the benefits of the re-
lease before filing suit against the employer, ratification would be a
proper defense.187 In such a case where the plaintiff is clearly acting
in bad faith and abusing her ADEA rights for monetary benefit, the
184. OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1544 ("[OBWPA] offers legal pro-
tections to those employees who otherwise might have been quietly and unknowingly
manipulated or coerced into waiving their statutory rights.").
185. Seward v. B.O.C. Div. of General Motors Corp., 805 F. Supp. 623, 633 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
186. See OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1544.
187. Such a determination would require an inquiry into the subjective intent of the
releasor; a task which some courts may not wish to undertake. See Seward, 805 F. Supp.
at 630 (citation omitted) ("inquir[y] into [the plaintiff's] subjective intent at the signing of
the [rielease . . . would unduly hamper the voluntary settlement of ADEA claims by
enabling a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of the plain language of a release by an
examination of the plaintiff's state of mind."). The court could also look at whether the
employee received the benefits in a lump-sum payment before a basis for an ADEA suit
was determined or in separate installments after determining grounds for litigation ex-
isted. See, e.g., Sperry v. Post Publishing Co., 773 F. Supp. 1557, 1558 (D. Conn. 1991)
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employer should be allowed to prove ratification. 18 This approach is
consistent with the policies underlying both the ADEA and OWBPA
- protecting unknowing and outmatched employees. 89 If the em-
ployee knowingly accepts the benefits despite awareness of a potential
ADEA claim, that employee should not be entitled to additional pro-
tection under the Act.
Second, there should not be a stringent tender requirement as a
condition precedent to challenging an ADEA release. As stated by
the court in Isaacs, "a judge-made [tender] requirement would elimi-
nate the ability of most employees to challenge releases obtained in
violation of the OWBPA." 1 0 In many situations, it will be burden-
some (if not impossible) for an employee to tender back the considera-
tion received for a waiver before filing suit.
For example, suppose a 45-year-old employee received a $30,000
lump sum benefit package in consideration for his ADEA release,
which he used to support himself and his family until he found new
employment. Pursuant to the tender requirement, this employee
would be required to repay the $30,000 before challenging his release
in court. As the court noted in Isaacs, "[Retired employees] are un-
likely to be able to put their severance payments aside for future 'ten-
ders', or to be able to come up with the money to make such a tender
at such later time as they acquire grounds to believe that a successful
lawsuit might be mounted in connection with their retirements."1 91 A
stringent tender requirement would have a "crippling" effect on em-
ployee challenges of ADEA waivers because it would be impossible
for most employees to challenge their releases - "a result that Con-
gress plainly does not want." 192
Third, a stringent tender requirement would undermine both the
specific requirements and the general purpose of the OWBPA. The
OWBPA clearly states that "[ain individual may not waive any right
(employee's retention of a lump sum severance payment did not constitute ratification of
the voidable release).
188. See, e.g., Seward, 805 F. Supp. at 633 (releasor was aware of questions concerning
the validity of the waiver yet continued to accept the benefits of the bargain). In this
situation, the court could look at the education and experience of the plaintiff to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff intentionally ratified the release. This approach had previously
been used in analyzing the validity of ADEA waivers. See, e.g., Runyan, 573 F. Supp. at
1457 (plaintiff was a well-educated labor lawyer with years of experience in employment
discrimination); Lancaster, 809 F.2d at 541 (plaintiff was a management employee with
experience in business and contracts).
189. See OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1544.
190. Isaacs v. Caterpillar, 765 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
191. Id. at 1367; see also Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1041.
192. Id.
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or claim under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and volun-
tary,""' and sets forth several threshold requirements to ensure this
result. As stated by the court in Oberg, "a tender requirement would
encourage employers to ignore the specific provisions of the
[OWBPA] in hopes that by the time their former employees discover
that the releases that they signed are voidable, they will be in no eco-
nomic position to tender back or refuse to accept the special severance
benefits accorded them."' 94 Since enforcement of a tender require-
ment in light of the recent passage of the OWBPA would "as a practi-
cal matter undo the Act's waiver provisions,"' 95 it seems unlikely that
Congress intended such a result. 196
Rather than impose a strict tender requirement, ADEA plaintiffs
should be allowed to delay the tender back of consideration by de-
ducting the amount of the benefits received from any judgment
awarded in the ADEA lawsuit. A delayed tender back requirement
would avoid the injustice of precluding an employee from challenging
his ADEA waiver simply because he is unable to restore the full
amount of the consideration. 97 The consideration would be returned
to the employer in connection with the relief granted by the court at
trial. 98
Arguably, a delayed tender requirement is burdensome upon em-
ployers. There is no guarantee that the employee will be successful at
trial; therefore, there may not be a judgment from which the consider-
ation can be deducted. Employers can argue that it is unfair to as-
sume that the employee will win and that a delayed tender
requirement "strips" them of the consideration they paid to obtain a
release defense.' 99 However, the mere fact that the employee files a
lawsuit and the court determines that the release is invalid does not
193. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. 1992).
194. Oberg, No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506, at *6.
195. Id. (citing Isaacs v. Caterpillar, 765 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D. Il. 1991)).
196. See Oberg, No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506 at *6 ("to conclude that an individual
may waive her ADEA rights by ratifying a waiver that was not knowing and voluntary
when signed because it did not fulfill the [OWBPA's] specific requirements... [i]s not
provided for by the language of the Act and was not contemplated by Congress"); cf
OWBPA Legislative History, supra note 86, at 1537 ("[t]he Committee intends that the
requirements of title II be strictly interpreted to protect those individuals covered by the
[OWBPA]").
197. This theory is supported by contract law and has been adopted by many courts in
dealing with ADEA waivers. See supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Isaacs,
765 F. Supp. at 1372-73, (arguing that ordinary contract principles required this result);
Oberg, No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 211506, at *7.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384 cmt. b (1981).
199. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1374.
[Vol. XX
RELEASES OF ADEA CLAIMS
"strip" the employer of the consideration paid.2" The employer can
file a counterclaim in the employee's ADEA suit for the amount of
the consideration paid to the employee.20 1 There is a risk that the
employee may be a judgment-proof plaintiff; however, the employer
has assumed this risk by using a faulty release and by not complying
with the law.
Employers may also argue that eliminating the tender requirement
is unfair because it allows plaintiffs to use their severance benefits to
fund their litigation.2°2 Retaining a strict tender requirement, how-
ever, would make it practically impossible for plaintiffs to challenge
ADEA releases, thus promoting the egregious employer conduct that
the ADEA and OWBPA were intended to abolish.20 3
Adopting a delayed tender approach does not give plaintiffs a
"double dip" or allow them "to have their cake and eat it too." 2°4
Rather, it provides the most equitable result possible for all involved
in light of the strong public policy underlying the ADEA and the
OWBPA.
D. Unresolved Issues
One related issue that courts will have to consider in deciding
whether to recognize the ratification defense in the context of ADEA
waivers is whether employers can sue their employees for breach of
contract claims if the employees file ADEA suits in violation of their
signed releases of such claims. This issue was presented in Widener v.
Arco Oil Co. ,20 in which the court ordered a jury trial to determine
the extent of damages that the defendant employer incurred as a re-
sult of employees' challenges to their ADEA waivers. 2° 6 The court
held that the plaintiffs had breached the express terms of the release
by filing their ADEA claims, and stated that "[b]ecause the purpose
of entering the release is to avoid litigation, the damages a releasor
200. Id.
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
202. See Samborn, supra note 3, at 3.
203. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367. The court stated that under a strict tender require-
ment, no matter how egregiously the defendant violated the OWBPA the plaintiff would
be precluded from any legal recourse unless he could somehow come up with the money
he had received. Id.
204. The Isaacs court stated that to require the plaintiff to tender the consideration
received would actually unjustly enrich the employer, because the employer would have
the returned consideration as well as the termination of the plaintiff, while the plaintiff
would lose both the consideration received and his employment, leaving him with noth-
ing more than his rescinded release. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367.
205. 717 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
206. Id. at 1218.
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suffers when the release is breached are its costs and attorneys' fees
incurred in defending against the wrongfully brought action."2 °7 The
circuit courts have yet to deal with this issue. Employers may argue
that their breach of contract suits against employees should be per-
mitted so that employers can recover the damages incurred as a result
of the employee's breach of a valid contract. Permitting such suits,
however, will augment the "crippling effect" on the filing of ADEA
claims.20 An employee who challenges his ADEA waiver would risk
losing his enhanced severance pay, which may be his only source of
income, and would also be in danger of a breach of contract counter-
claim brought by the employer to recover attorney fees. These risks
will discourage employees from litigating valid age discrimination
claims.
Another issue of concern to the courts is what position the parties
should be returned to in order to restore the status quo ante. If the
waiver is held invalid, the parties should be returned to the position
they would have been in but for the invalid waiver." It is unclear,
however, what exactly the status quo ante is. Should the parties be
returned to a stage in which the employee has been terminated and
has an unencumbered right to sue the employer for age discrimina-
tion? Such a restoration may not be comforting to an employee who
is left jobless, without substantial severance pay, and armed only with
the right to sue on an ADEA claim that has no guarantee of success.
In the alternative, should the employee be reinstated with backpay to
the position held prior to signing the release? Such a remedy would
operate harshly on employers who may have acted in good faith in
using releases as part of the termination process. Moreover, this rem-
edy would constitute a de facto adjudication of the ADEA claim in
the employee's favor, even though the court has merely found the
waiver of the claim invalid. The implications for the parties under
either alternative are clear.
V. Conclusion
Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find
themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination ....
207. Id. at 1217; but see Haslach v. Security Pac. Bank Or., 779 F. Supp. 489, 494 (D.
Or. 1991) (citing Gruver v. Midas Int'l Corp., 925 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1991) (majority
view under American rule is that "attorney's fees are not awardable when there has been
a breach of a release ... unless attorneys' fees were provided for in that release;" ADEA
release did not provide for attorneys' fees)).
208. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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[T]his is a serious - and senseless - loss to a nation on the move.
But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-
being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their fami-
lies. Opportunity must be opened to the many Americans over 45
who are qualified and willing to work. We must end arbitrary age
limits on hiring.210
Although nearly thirty years have passed since President Lyndon
B. Johnson recited those words and triggered the drafting of the
ADEA, age discrimination in employment continues to be a pervasive
evil in this nation. As more and more members of the "baby boom
generation" enter their forties and become part of the ADEA's pro-
tected age group, and as employees become more aware of their rights
and more willing to sue their employers, the ADEA promises to play
an even larger role in employment law in the United States.21" '
The issue of ratification of ADEA waivers is an important one
which is in dire need of resolution. Until the controversy is settled,
courts will continue to clash over whether ratification is an acceptable
defense to employees' challenges of ADEA waivers. In resolving this
issue, the most important consideration should be achieving a result
which serves the interests of justice and fairness in light of the rights
and obligations on both sides. This Note has proposed that the ratifi-
cation defense should continue to be available to employers, but
should be limited to those situations where the employee knowingly
and voluntarily waives his ADEA rights, yet seeks to "have his cake
and eat it too" by keeping the added severance benefits while retaining
the right to sue his employer. In other cases, retention by the plaintiff
of severance benefits would not ratify an invalid release and thus
would not be a bar to an age discrimination lawsuit.
Until the situation is resolved by the courts or the legislature, how-
ever, employers and employees must each do their part to comply
with the laws and avail themselves of the protections afforded them.
Employers should practice strict compliance with the requirements of
the OWBPA, and should consider offering additional services to exit-
ing employees to aid them in their job search.2 12 Employees, on the
other hand, should seek counsel before signing a waiver, and should
ensure that they are fully aware of their rights under the ADEA. If
each side works at becoming more responsible in their actions, waiv-
210. 113 CONG. REC. 34743-44 (1967) (Representative Kelly quoting President Lyn-
don B. Johnson, Older Americans Message to Congress (Jan. 23, 1967)).
211. See O'MEARA, supra note 30, at 3.
212. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 9, at 26 (employer offered in-house counseling on job
hunting for laid off staff members).
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ers can continue to be used as a welcome alternative to litigation
under the ADEA.
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